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Abstract 
Through the Internet of Things (IoT) interaction between objects becomes possible in a way we have never seen before. With the advent of IoT 
and its introduction into almost all aspects of life, safety and security of IoT devices has to be considered for their whole life cycle. This 
concerns not only the large amounts of data that needs to be exchanged securely but also the design of the hardware of the devices themselves. 
Security has to be designed right from the start into IoT devices rather than added on later.  
This paper will introduce a global strategy for secure Design for IoT which includes: 
Ü Safe solutions for environments with rich information  
Ü Guarantee that the devices are functioning as intended by the manufacturer and are not damaged 
Ü Life cycle security across devices, networks and data centers 
Ü Support for industry standards and interoperability of devices 
Ü Ability to solve the challenges of the information link 
Ü Secure Clouds for traditional systems. 
This paper lays the foundation for the creation of a safe remote monitoring system for machine tools through IoT devices and analyses the 
critical issues focusing on the manufacturing environment. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Programme Chair of the Fourth International Conference on Through-life Engineering Services. 
 Keywords: Remote Maintenance; Machine Tool; Secure Communications; Remote Monitoring;IoT
1. Introduction 
Currently, the continued growth of Internet of Things (IoT) 
has made remarkable progress in information technology. 
This technique has become an important engine of economic 
growth around the world [1, 2]. The idea of IoT goes back to 
the 1998, when it was given a first description by a British 
researcher and co-founder of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). He called the IoT the set of “all things 
that are connected with Internet through sensors, such Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), to achieve intelligent 
identification and management” [3]. Many different 
definitions have since followed and each geared to highlight 
the main possible scope of IoT application. In this sense, the 
Internet of Things can be considered "a family of technologies 
whose aim is to make any type of object or device connected 
to the Internet, able to enjoy all the features that the objects 
created to use the network” [4]. 
Nowadays, the properties related to the IoT systems are 
essentially two: monitoring and control. With monitoring, we 
intend the capability of the object to behave as a sensor or to 
be able to produce information about itself or the 
encompassing environment. Instead, the control means that 
objects can be remotely controlled with no particular 
technologies but through the Internet. In the industrial sector, 
the Internet of Things (IoT) thing is associated with the 
concept that intelligent machines, devices and people are 
connected through them. This connection leads to the 
possibility of making better decisions with large databases 
and advanced analytics. This aspect is of high important for 
factories that will be increasingly intelligent. There will be a 
significant improvement in the ability to collect, analyse and 
distribute data converted into important information. This 
could help factories in maintenance operations through the 
sharing of data with the service assistance. In this paper it will 
be explored what enterprises can do to manage the security 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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risks associated with IoT devices. The paper presents the main 
cause of potential data loss in remote maintenance 
architectures. A practical example demonstrates a new 
approach to increase the level of safe remote monitoring 
system for machine tools through IoT devices. 
2. Research problem 
One of the aims of manufacturing enterprises is to produce 
high-quality products characterized by no defects. It is also 
requested that the machine tool can maintain high overall 
equipment efficiency (OEE), without compromising the 
company’s profit because of prolonged shutdowns. 
A part of the research aim is to provide support to 
companies that do not have a remote maintenance system for 
machine tools. The occurrence of a machine downtime is 
transformed into a loss of competitiveness on the market, loss 
of money and time. A company is required to immediately 
contact servicing, to reduce machine downtime.  However, in 
many cases, there could be a significant delay before 
returning the machinery to operational status. During this 
time, the service engineer will perform an initial diagnosis to 
understand the underlying problem, extending the machine 
downtime.  
Ideally, a company is configured with a remote 
maintenance system for machine tools. In this case, the major 
problems arise to ensure long life to the maintenance system, 
evaluating the reliability of all the connected devices. Remote 
maintenance, however, is linked with the issue of the 
protection of machine data over public or private networks. 
Another problem involves the secure communications with 
the assistance service on the public networks. 
This paper addresses this challenge through providing 
guidance to companies that consider remote maintenance as a 
solution to higher productivity, involving the protection of 
machine data from threats which would entail a leak of 
information knowledge. 
3. Related work 
Currently, many research projects have been proposed to 
develop remote monitoring and maintenance systems 
(RMMS). Yang et al. [5] developed an Internet-based remote 
maintenance system for process control. Feldmann and 
Göhringer [6] have developed an Internet-based diagnosis of a 
monitoring system for maintenance. Lung et al. [7] developed 
a maintenance tool to facilitate remote decision making. 
Cunha et al. [8] developed a service module as input for 
production planning. Mori et al. [9] proposed a practical way 
to improve the efficiency of maintenance by monitoring and 
analysing the state of operation of 8000 machine tools 
simultaneously worldwide.  
With respect to remote monitoring and maintenance 
systems through IoT devices, Yonggang   et al. [10] 
developed a wall-mounted boiler remote monitoring and 
control system based on IoT cloud platform. Wang et al. [11] 
developed an IoT application for fault diagnosis and 
prediction. Sharma and Suryakanthi [12] developed a system 
called IoT for University. Lee at al. [13] developed a smart 
home web of object architecture. Alexandru et al. [14] 
develop a smart web-based maintenance system for a smart 
manufacturing environment.  
With regards to system data protection through IoT devices 
Tiburski et al. [15] developed a security architecture for SOA-
based IoT middleware. As a threat analysis for embedded 
devices, and monitoring systems, Shahri and Ismail [16] 
developed a model for identification of threats as the first 
stage of risk assessment in Health Information System (HIS). 
Di and Smith [17] developed a hardware threat modelling 
concept for trustable integrated circuits. Di-Battista et al. [18] 
analysed side-channel attack methods. Kim et al. [19] 
developed an extensive analysis of side-channel attacks on 
cryptographic module. Nakai et al. [20] studied the cause of 
memory-dependent EM geometric leaks.  
These developments published in literature present 
different remote monitoring and maintenance systems and 
strategies useful to evaluate the health status of industrial 
machines. Moreover, a collection of the papers focused 
particularly on the IoT applications within the home, 
university, and industry field. Shahri and Ismail reviews 
common threats in the industrial environment such as human, 
technical and physical threats. 
Throughout most of these examples from literature, 
particularly those focused on IoT and monitoring systems, the 
reader is confronted with a situation in which many do not 
focus on security related issues of these remote technologies, 
which will be a significant concern for industries looking to 
utilize and exploit these technologies. This paper introduces a 
strategy to analyze and design a safe solution for 
environments with rich information. 
4. Identified threats 
The identification of threats is a fundamental stage in risk 
management and the social science has long had privacy and 
security issues as a major subject. In literature a lack of a 
systematic investigation for the identification and 
categorization of threats related to information security and 
privacy can be observed [21]. 
 
Figure 1: Threats modelling process 
        In Figure 1, the three high-levels constituting the 
preliminary hardware threat modeling process are shown. 
They consist in Understanding Point of View, Identifying 
Threats, and Determining Attacks. Furthermore, the first two 
steps can be divided into logical sub-steps. 
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Understanding Attackers’ Aims 
The purpose of this level is the understanding of what the 
attackers want. It represents a critical aspect considering that 
the threat modeling aims to prevent the satisfaction of the 
attackers’ goals which, then, must be well understood. 
Entry points – are the entrances where the attackers can 
interface with the target. Unlike in software/network systems, 
where the entry points are usually difficult to enumerate and 
subject to change, entry points for hardware are much fewer 
and relatively fixed. 
Goals – Usually, the hardware attackers’ goals are linked 
to the integrated circuits. They can determine: 
X Information leakage – attackers manage to directly 
extract information from an integrated circuit, 
passively or actively, as an individual component or 
as an element of an integrated system. Information to 
be protected includes the IP associated with a chipset 
and its design, data with both the hardware and 
deployed software, and data embedded [22]. 
X Tampering – attackers eavesdrop on or modify the 
data associated with the integrated circuit by 
prolonged inspection and monitoring. 
X Denial of service – attackers manage to modify the 
structure of the internal circuit of an integrated 
system to cause its malfunction or shutting down 
under operating conditions. 
 
Identify threats 
The scope of this level is the identification of all possible 
threats to the IoT system for the attackers aiming to reach 
their goals. An attacker could be interested in acquiring of the 
cryptographic key stored in an integrated circuit from IoT 
system, and then the corresponding threat would be the access 
to the RAM chip and controlling the internal bus. 
Understand IoT structure – The goal of this sub step is to 
understand the integrated circuits functionality and its internal 
circuit structure, which will help identify the threats. 
Use scenarios – This sub step aim is to determine the 
potential applications of the target IoT. 
By so doing will expand the threats modelling process with 
human and physical factors.  
Enumerate threats – It is possible to enumerate all potential 
threats in an IoT system because once configured, the IoT 
structure will be fixed. All threats will be enumerated based 
on the understanding of attackers’ goals, IoT structure, and 
external scenarios. 
 
Determine attacks 
The purpose of this level is to individuate how the attackers 
could reach their objective by enumerating and listing all 
possible attacks associated with each threat individuated in 
the previous level. This process will take into account both the 
internal circuit structure and the external scenarios. 
5. Classification of threats 
An important part of this research is to analyse the most 
common causes for data loss in industrial applications. This 
served as a starting point for analysing the remote monitoring 
system and to find some mitigation useful to develop robust 
remote monitoring system architectures. To furnish this 
analysis, a literature review [16-20], survey and interview 
have been undertaken. Table 1 shows an overview of threats 
considered in this research work. The threat research is 
categorized into three main groups: Human, Physical and 
Technical. Categories depend on the work environment. In the 
case of this paper, remote monitoring of a 24-hour 
manufacturing environment is considered.  
Table 2 shows an overview of threat examples that 
contributes to the development of a more secure remote 
monitoring system through secure IoT device. 
 
Human Threats 
Threats Descriptions 
Inadvertent Acts or 
Carelessness 
Are unintentional acts that could cause system 
performance degradation or system loss. 
Data entry errors or 
omissions 
Are non-malicious threats that could affect system 
resources and the safeguards that are protecting 
other system resources. 
Physical Intrusions Are deliberate malicious acts that could cause 
damage, destruction, or loss of system assets.  Such 
an act could also enable other threats, such as 
compromise of interconnected systems. 
User Abuse  Addresses authorized users who abuse their 
assigned access privileges or rights to gain 
additional information or privileges. 
Unauthorised use of 
remote maintenance 
accesses 
Are continuous acts that could cause damage of 
system assets.  Such an act could also enable other 
threats, such as the insertion of virus, collect 
sensitive information. 
Introduction of 
malicious code via 
removable media 
and external 
hardware  
Access to external ports for the introduction of 
viruses into the system, or new settings. 
Physical Threats 
Threats Descriptions 
Electromagnetic 
interference 
Is the impact of signal transmitters and receivers 
operating in proximity integrated system, which 
could cause an interruption in the electronic 
operation of the system. 
Physical cable cuts Could be an intentional or unintentional event that 
affects the system’s ability to perform its intended 
function. 
Power fluctuation Is a disruption in the primary power source (power 
spike, surge, brownout, and blackout) that results in 
either insufficient or excessive power. 
Voltage spikes Refers to a rapid variation of voltage, more 
specifically to a voltage peak and short duration, 
may cause damage system assets. 
Technical Threats 
Threats Descriptions 
Dangerous  
emanations 
Are the unintentional data-related or intelligence-
bearing signals, which, if intercepted and analyzed, 
could disclose sensitive information being 
transmitted and/or processed. 
Data/system 
contaminations 
Is the intermixing of data of different sensitivity 
levels, which could lead to an accidental or 
intentional violation of data integrity. 
Hardware Is the unexpected loss of operational functionality 
of any system hardware asset. 
Software Is the malicious intent to change a system’s 
configuration without authorization by the addition 
or modification of code, software, database records, 
or information. 
Installation errors Are the errors, which could occur as an of result 
poor installation procedures. Could undermine 
security controls. 
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Tampering Is an unauthorized modification that alters the 
proper functioning of equipment in a manner that 
degrades the security functionality the asset 
provides. 
Takeover of 
authorized session 
Is gaining control of an authorized session, and 
assuming the access rights of the authorized party. 
Online attacks via 
office 
Is an unauthorized modification takes place within 
the local network that alters the proper functioning 
of equipment. 
Reading and 
messages in the 
integrated system 
Access to communications equipment that allows 
the free leakage of sensitive information. 
Table 1: A summary threat analysis descriptions, condensed 
from [16] 
 
Human Threats 
Threats Examples 
Inadvertent Acts or 
Carelessness 
-Programming and development errors result in 
software vulnerabilities.  
-Incorrect operations of database synchronization 
procedures could result in data errors and deletion. 
-Improper upgrades to database management 
software.  
-Programming and development errors could cause 
a buffer overflow. 
-Installation, upgrade, and maintenance errors could 
leave data unprotected. 
Data entry errors or 
omissions 
-Failure to disable or delete unnecessary accounts 
(network, Internet), could provide unauthorized 
access to system resources. 
-If the system administrator fails to perform some 
function essential to security, it could place a 
system and its data at risk of compromise. 
Physical Intrusions -Disgruntled employees could create both mischief 
and sabotage of system data. 
-Sensitive data could be captured through 
application vulnerabilities, and held hostage. 
-Disgruntled employees could sabotage a computer 
system by installation of software that could 
damage the system or the data. 
-Destruction of hardware or facilities could destroy 
data that might not be recovered. 
-Computer abuse such as intentional and improper 
use, alteration and disruption could result in loss of 
system assets. 
-Cleaning staffs/vendors or contractors could steal 
unsecured sensitive information 
User Abuse  -Use of information (password) as an indirect aid 
for subsequent misuse 
-The opening of an unprotected port on a firewall 
could provide unauthorized access to information 
Unauthorised use of 
remote maintenance 
accesses 
-Unauthorised personnel could change passwords, 
account and system assets 
-Modify maintenance parameters 
Introduction of 
malicious code via 
removable media 
and external 
hardware  
-Trojan  
-New system assets 
Physical Threats 
Threats Examples 
Electromagnetic 
interference 
-Malfunctioning equipment 
-An extended power surge, over-stress power 
supplies and lead to computer equipment damage. 
-A power failure, disrupting network operation, 
computer screens to go blank, and servers to crash. 
Physical cable cuts -A disgruntled employee could sabotage 
transmission media 
-Animals could cause damages to cables resulting 
in broken cables. 
-Lightning strikes could cause a structural fire, 
which could, in turn, burn out circuits resulting in a 
power failure. 
-Lightning strikes could cause severe damage 
resulting in broken cables. 
Power fluctuation -Malfunction or failure of Central Processing Unit 
(CPU) or hardware could impact the timeliness and 
quality of the delivered services. 
Voltage spikes -Malfunction of CPU or hardware equipment. 
-Internal power disturbances could result in loss of 
system data. 
Technical Threats 
Threats Examples 
Dangerous 
emanations 
-Radiation or signals that emanate from a 
communications circuit could disclose to 
unauthorized persons or equipment the sensitive or 
proprietary information that is being transmitted via 
the circuit. 
Data/system 
contaminations 
-Anomalies and multiple numbers for the same 
entity could allow unauthorized access to data. 
-Corrupted system files could contain strings of 
sensitive information. 
-File fragments containing sensitive information 
could be scattered throughout a drive instead of in 
an encrypted sector to protect them from 
compromise. 
Hardware -Malfunction or failure of Central Processing Unit 
(CPU)  
-Faulty network components such as hosts, routers 
and firewalls could result in interruption of 
communications between the connected stations. 
-Improper hardware maintenance could allow a 
system crash to occur. 
-Timing Attack 
Software -Modification, insertion, or deletion of data or lines 
of code could compromise data and/or system. 
-Unauthorized modification of database records 
could compromise data integrity and availability. 
-Trojan Horse applications could be installed 
through code and software modifications.   
-Logic bombs could be placed within authorized 
software and perform malicious system actions on a 
given trigger event. 
Installation errors -Poor installation procedures could leave data 
unprotected, e.g. built-in security features of 
software packages are not implemented. 
-Incorrect installation or a conflict with another 
device that is competing for the same resources 
within the computer system could impact system 
data and resource availability. 
Tampering -Web hacks could deface a web site, or disable the 
web server functionality. 
-Domain Name Service hacks could prevent 
authorized users from properly accessing network 
or Internet resources. 
Takeover of 
authorized session 
-When a user leaves the immediate work area and a 
session remains open, unauthorized use could 
occur. 
Online attacks via 
office 
-Unauthorized staffs could have access to sensitive 
information. 
Reading and 
messages in the 
integrated system 
-Sharing of badges, key cards, and passwords could 
provide unauthorized access to private  information. 
-Forged email messages could reveal sensitive 
information. 
Table 2: A summary of threats analysis examples, condensed 
from [16] 
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6. Develop a global design strategy for securing IoT 
devices 
The process of configuring secure IoT devices launches the 
bases as a new approach. This approach may not only be used 
in the manufacturing environmental but with the right changes 
also in other working environments.  
Figure 2 shows a global strategy for securing IoT devices. 
The process is divided into four main categories. 
Define requirements – includes the threats analysis and the 
signals to be measured to make maintenance. 
Prototype concept – this category involve the physical 
construction of the device, paying attention to the choice of 
modules.  
 
Figure 2: Configuration process 
Evaluate concept -it concerns the concept of evaluation 
through the selection of threats mitigations. By so doing will 
develop best technical solution for remote monitoring. Verify 
requirements -it’s the evaluation phase of the prototype 
through experiments and comparisons with other devices. 
Only by so doing we will understand if our monitoring system 
appears to be safer than those on the market. 
7. Design of a safe remote system for machine tools 
through IoT devices 
An IT scenario can be greatly influenced by IoT 
technology, determining a competitive advantage for 
business. Also, it has to be considered that the companies are 
subject to several new threats with the use of new technology. 
Figure 3 shows the architecture of a data protection and 
secure communication system that has been developed for this 
paper. From the hardware point of view, the proposed system 
provides a Data Acquisition Unit (DAQ), made from 
Raspberry Pi model B, a Wi-Fi module, the accelerometer 
MPU 6050, a FLIR lepton thermal imaging module for 
temperature monitoring, and a power bank of 3350 mAh that 
provides sufficient battery life for the unit.  
The system is able to collect acceleration and temperature 
data at 1 kHz with 100 kbps baud rate in a single 14 byte read 
and over  I2C running at 400 kbps baud rate. The thermal 
camera module captures infrared radiation within the 
wavelength band from 8 to 14 microns. 
All the collected data is not stored within the 
microcontroller but is transferred to storage and sharing units 
accessible only to accredited persons via cloud storage. 
Inside the system are a combined iteration of the HTTP 
protocol through a mechanism of encryption such as Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL), the acquired data are then transferred to 
the Cloud system. The SSL protocol provides connection 
security guarantees [23]: 
X Authentication (security identity of the subjects that 
communicate) 
X Data confidentiality (protection of data from 
unauthorized observers) 
X Data integrity (security that the data received is equal 
to the datum sent). 
 
Figure 3: System data protection and secure 
communication 
 
This system architecture allows for the mitigation of some 
possible threats that occur on the communication network that 
were highlighted in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 4: Data Acquisition Unit (DAQ) 
 
Figure 4 shows the DAQ design, which is compact, 
lightweight and divided into 3 modules: power bank module 
(1), CPU module (2) and the thermal camera module (3), in 
order to facilitate the direct maintenance operations. The 
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power bank is to avoid power fluctuation and voltage spikes, 
and the lack of external cables avoids direct physical 
interfacing and tampering. The protective cover does not 
allow access to the unit for unauthorized persons. The system 
is assembled together on the DMG machine tool spindle and 
used during machining operations. On the board, all external 
ports are disabled except a USB port for the Wi-Fi connection 
and Micro USB for power bank. To collect vibration signals 
and temperature data, you must have an account and password 
to access the executable file that launches the remote 
program. The monitoring system is equipped with 256-bit 
AES encryption [24]. An increase of data security is achieved 
sby the microcontroller on board which collects the data and 
writes an encrypted text file that will be sent directly to the 
Cloud system. At this point, all data within the 
microcontroller is deleted so as not to occupy valuable 
memory and to not leave traces of data on the device. Inside 
the Cloud, the data will be provided in encrypted form and 
only those with keys and a valid certificate will have access. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, the foundation for the realization of a 
methodical approach for preventive maintenance through IoT 
device as a data acquisition unit capable of self-learning 
during the run-time of a machine tool has been presented. The 
methodical approach is focused on threats that generate a loss 
of data or information from the monitoring system. Future 
work aims to utilize this monitoring system also as a remote 
control system for different actuators. 
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